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IAC-D-103/8  
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Fourth Semi-Annual Report of  
IAC Ad Hoc Committee on Exchanges

I. Authorization

The IAC Ad Hoc Committee on Exchanges was established pursuant to IAC action of 28 February 1956, for the purpose of maximizing the intelligence yield from East-West delegation exchanges. [Note: The IAC expanded the Committee's area of responsibility to include materiel subsequent to the reporting period.] IAC-D-103 has served as a guide and general terms of reference.

II. Organization

The Committee consists of representatives from the Department of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Joint Staff, CIA, and AEC. USIA also attends on a regular basis. CIA provides the Chairman and the Secretariat. The Committee does not have subcommittee structure but seeks the advice of existing substantive committees or subcommittees of IAC or appoints ad hoc groups for cases in which no extant group is competent.

III. Aims and Activities

This report covers the period from 1 February to 31 July 1958. The tempo of exchange activity and detailed negotiations increased substantially following the signing of the 27 January 1958 Exchange Agreement. The impetus is provided by the efforts of the Department of State to implement the agreement and the increased public interest resulting in large part from the fact that

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the publicized government encouragement of exchanges in connection with the agreement came during the period of active concern over Soviet technological progress. In contrast to the prior eight-month period when only three US-USSR exchanges were carried out, this six-month period has seen at least one end of fourteen different exchanges get under way. In addition, negotiations are in progress on at least a dozen other significant exchanges and many others are in various stages of preparation.

Many of the projects previously reviewed by the Committee have become actual exchanges or are in advanced stages of negotiation. A large part of the activity has been support for these proposals. Specifically the principle activities were as follows:

1. Advising the Department of State on the intelligence aspects of exchanges and exchange proposals. Proposals covering eleven widely diverse subjects, ranging from anthropology to crystallography, were reviewed at the request of the Department of State.

In addition to the specific items, general guidelines were laid down regarding the intelligence viewpoint concerning exchanges of professors and students, and conference attendance and interpreters. The academic exchanges are regarded as advantageous whereas non-reciprocal conference attendance by Soviets in those cases in which tours and closed areas are not involved is believed to be "not seriously disadvantageous." The fact that full proceedings are usually published and circulated widely limits the Soviet gain to be realized by attendance. On the other hand, the Committee noted that the Soviets are reluctant

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to provide reciprocity for conference attendance in certain fields and urged that a proposal in those fields be considered individually. The Department of State policy of not permitting Soviet delegations to bring their own interpreters was endorsed because the US has not been able to cash the reciprocity and the Soviet interpreters restrict collection opportunities in the US.

In the case of the series of Agricultural exchanges, it was judged necessary to warn strongly that the conditions leading to a US net advantage assessment were not being imposed. Efforts were made to correct the imbalance by briefing the US delegations to make strong representations for information and to indicate clearly dissatisfaction with evasions or refusals. The developments are being monitored closely with the intention of recommending alterations in the US tours if Soviet recalcitrance persists.

b. Suggesting exchange proposals for US initiative. At the request of the CCPC, the Committee is again considering a proposal for exchanges in guided missile fields. With this single exception, intelligence initiative has been supplied through individual agencies arranging for contractors or consultants to make private proposals to the Soviets, usually through the Department of State.

c. Assisting in the carrying out of exchanges. The preparation and negotiation of an exchange can be a long complicated process, particularly when plant visits are involved. A juggling of intelligence

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targets, private sponsor desires, and internal security concerns is involved on the US side and must be repeated for each proposal and counter-proposal in each exchange. The Committee has provided technical advice to the Department by furnishing an appropriate intelligence specialist for each project of intelligence interest. The pride, spirit of hospitality, and lack of knowledge of the USSR on the part of the US citizens involved frequently results in a desire on their part to comply with Soviet wishes regarding the tour, while at the same time accepting Soviet excuses for not permitting access to areas of concealment on the tour in the USSR. This is a source of grave concern to the Committee because in the course of frequent changes in the arrangements, the qualifications and reservations contained in the net advantage assessment can be overlooked. The East-West Contacts Staff, Department of State is alert to this problem but when US citizens are committed to a course of action persuasion is not always effective.

d. Coordinating intelligence interest and activities. The negotiations over many of the exchanges have been concluded only at the kick-off time, indeed in some cases only after the game was well under way. Since the briefings must ideally be based on the actual visit, they have been difficult to organize. The disadvantage caused by the protracted negotiations has in some cases been extended by coordination failures. It is believed that the procedures established by the Committee for briefing and debriefing are adequate and that with renewed efforts on behalf of the participating agencies will correct the situation in short order.

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IV. Prospects and Emerging Problems

The vastly increased activity forecast in the prior Semi-Annual Report seems likely to continue, with seasonal fluctuations, during the next reporting period. Of great significance in this regard is the long delayed meeting between the leaders of the US and Soviet National Academies of Science. This meeting should form the basis for the scientific exchanges for the near future. This Committee is concerned over the prospective scientific exchange program in that the US intends to propose abandonment of the principle of specific reciprocity in favor of a constant effort to maintain an equitable balance between the total visits. Experience has shown that the organized, informed nature of the Soviet program in contrast with the compartmentalized uninformed US program has sorely taxed the Government bodies attempting to enforce specific reciprocity. A general balance, while more desirable, is much more difficult to contrive and determine. Furthermore, no known mechanism is available or planned to measure or enforce the equality. The Committee will follow the developments and assist where possible.

An additional source of concern is the commercial program. The Soviets have started to send some delegations to purchase equipment. These have not been subject to reciprocity and have been controlled only loosely because the US Government has felt constrained to allow private business opportunities for profit. Should the Soviets choose to exploit this situation, they could arrange many more visits without paying in kind. The Committee will consider a plan to counteract this disadvantage.

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It is planned that a major evaluation of the program be prepared in late 1958. This should provide assistance in formulating the 1959 Exchange Program. In addition, an attempt will be made to bring about better internal intelligence community coordination in regard to the briefing and debriefing as outlined in III. d. above and the individual agency initiations covered in III. b. These latter have been a source of some difficulty largely due to internal coordination in the agencies involved.

The general view is that the known facts augur well for the future potential of the program. Direct exposure to Soviet tactics have been educational in many cases, and the US public by and large is showing an increased willingness to assist the Department of State in accomplishing its aims. Long-term student exchanges planned for the 1958-59 school year are viewed with particular optimism, and only the scientific and commercial programs are clouds on an otherwise bright horizon.

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